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ST. LOUIS LAW REVIEW
STATUTORY EXTENSION TO INDIVIDUALS UNDER THE
RECENT AMENDMENTS TO THE BANKRUPTCY ACT
The passage of the amendments to the bankruptcy act on March
3, 1933, was hailed as likely to bring swift relief to many indi-
vidual debtors.1 Its opponents urged that it was perhaps uncon-
stitutional and certainly very harsh towards secured creditors. 2
Whatever the truth of these charges, the bill has been little used
by individual debtors, although several prominent railroads are
now trying to reorganize their financial structures under the ma-
chinery provided by the section of the amendments which applies
solely to railroads. In so far as the purpose of the statute was to
protect small home-owners from having their homes taken from
them by foreclosure of mortgages, this recent statute is now
largely obsolete, in view of the more direct means of refinancing
available under the statute passed by the extra session just ad-
journed, providing for direct government loans or the issuance
of bonds whose interest (but not principal) is guaranteed by the
United States.3 However, the law may still be utilized to give
other classes of individuals, particularly the small business man,
considerable benefits. It is the purpose of this note to examine
the provisions of the law, in so far as they affect individuals, 4 at-
tempting to point out the changes it has made in the earlier bank-
ruptcy practice and the places in which the law should be clarified
in order that it may be consistent with itself or do more perfect
justice.
The first change made by the new amendments is the formal
permission granted persons not insolvent to avail themselves vol-
untarily of the benefits of a bankruptcy act. The Act of 1898
defined an insolvent as a person, the aggregate of whose property
"exclusive of any property which he may have conveyed, trans-
ferred, concealed or removed or permitted to be concealed or re-
moved with intent to defraud, hinder, or delay his creditors, shall
1 Act of March 3, 1933, 11 U. S. C. 201-205, adding sections 73, 74, 75, 76
and 77 to the Act.
2 Secured debtor in this paper is used as defined by sec. 1 (23) of the Act
of 1898: "Secured creditor shall include a creditor who has security for his
debt upon the property of the bankrupt of a nature to be assignable under
the provisions of this act, or who owns such a debt for which some indorser,
surety, or other person secondarily liable for the bankrupt has such security
upon the bankrupt's assets." 39 Stat. 540 (1898), 11 U. S. C. 1.
3Cf. the provisions of the Home Owners' Loan Act and the Farm Mortgage
Loan Act signed by President Roosevelt in June, 1933.
4 The essentially different background of the provisions as to railroads
precludes their consideration in this note. The railroad provisions are
grouped in section 77 of the new amendment.
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not, at a fair valuation, be sufficient in amount to pay his debts." 5
The new statute expressly allows a person voluntarily to resort
to it who is either "insolvent or unable to meet his debts as they
mature." 6 At first glance this seems a great extension of the
class of who may be voluntary bankrupts. Actually it is not.
Under the Act of 1898 a person might be a voluntary bankrupt
even though he was not insolvent.7 No creditor could object.8
Less apparent but in reality far more important is the change
in the debts which may be allowed to share in the distribution of
the estate which passes into the hands of the bankruptcy court.
Under the Act of 1898 only five classes of debts might be proved.9
It is true that two of the classes were very broad,' 0 but neverthe-
less there were certain common types of claims which could not be
proved. The most important of these were claims for future
rent 11 and claims for tortious injuries which had not been reduced
to judgment at the time the petition was filed. 12 The new amend-
ment expressly provides that debts affected by an extension "shall
include all claims of whatever character against the debtor or his
property, including a claim for future rent, whether or not such
claims would otherwise constitute provable claims under this
Act." 13 Under this provision, the debtor need not even be per-
sonally liable on the debt, provided it is a lien on his property,
e.g. where he has bought land subject to a mortgage, but without
assuming the mortgage. This last is entirely novel. Although
the Act of 1898 did provide for the allowance of the balance of
secured claims after the amount of the security had been de-
termined and deducted, it required that the bankrupt be person-
5 Sec. 1 (15). All citations are to the sections of the Act as they appear in
the Statutes at Large.
6 Sec. 74 (a). Special provisions are made for agricultural compositions
and extensions in sec. 75. These are largely the same as those of sec. 74
except that special commissioners are to be appointed in certain instances.
These officials will largely replace the referees. References will be given to
the corresponding provisions of both sections and important differences will
be pointed out. The corresponding provision is sec. 75 (c).
7 Hanover Nat. Bank v. Moyses (1902) 186 U. S. 181.
9 Manover Nat. Bank v. Moyses, above.
9Sec. 63 (a).
1o Class 1 allowed the proof of all fixed liabilities evidenced by a judgment
or instrument in writing absolutely owing at the time of the filing of the
petition. Class 5 allowed the proof of claims founded upon an open account
or a contract expressed or implied.
11 Schubacher and Weinstein, Rent Claims in Bankruptcy, (1933) 33
Col. L. Rev. 213.
12 Remington on Bankruptcy (3rd ed.) sec. 767.
Is Sec. 74 (a). Unfortunately there is no similar provision in the section
dealing with agricultural extensions.
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ally liable for the debt. 14 This change will cause no difficulty in
cases where the extension agreement is finally confirmed and put
into effect, but it may lead to strange results in cases where the ex-
tension is refused and the debtor adjudicated a bankrupt. It
would seem that this extension of provable debts is only "for the
purpose of the extension proposal."' 1 If this is refused, then the
older test is employed, which may materially lessen the amount
of the debts which will share in the distribution. However, this
result seems to be the only practical one, because an extension
proposal may be filed in an involuntary case even though the
debtor is actually insolvent, and it would not be just to vary the
proportion that the petitioning creditors shall obtain on their
claims by the mere fact whether or not the debtor chose to attempt
in vain to secure an extension.
We are now in a position to examine the heart of the new
amendment, i.e. the provisions for an extension of certain types
of indebtedness. There are two important classes of debts which
cannot be extended under this new statute, unless the creditors
consent. The money necessary to pay all debts which under the
Act of 1898 have priority' 6 must be deposited before an extension
can be confirmed by the court.17 However, there is a provision
that if the holders of such debts consent to have them extended,
they shall not lose their priority. Although there is no express
provision, it would seem that each such creditor must act indi-
vidually in waiving his priority and that a majority may not
compel a dissenting minority to join in a general waiver. Se-
cured debts, the security for which is not in the actual or con-
structive possession of the debtor or the custodian or receiver,
may not be extended against the will of the creditor.' s Indeed,
the statute gives no express authority for allowing the extension
to extend such debts, even with the consent of creditors. It would
seem, however, that such a power should be implied in view of the
general remedial purpose of the statute. It is to be regretted
that this point is not made clear. This provision was probably
necessary to allow banks to realize on the collateral securing loans
made by them, which collateral is always in the possession of the
bank and not the debtor. It lessens the relief obtainable by the
extension, but if banks are to meet the demands of their depos-
itors, they cannot be required to irrevocably extend credit for
long periods of time.
34 Secs. 63 (a), 57 (h).
15 Sec. 74 (a).
' Sec. 64.
27 Sec. 74 (e) ; sec. 75 (g).
18 Sec. 74 (h). The section as to agricultural extension contains no such
limitation. Sec. 75 (j).
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There are other limits to the nature of the extension plan de-
signed to protect the interests of creditors. The plan may not,
according to the amendment, reduce the amount due to a secured
creditor or impair the lien which secures the debt. 19 This protec-
tion is not as great as it seems. The new statute specifically al-
lows changes in the time and means of payment. If the time be
extended without paying the full market rate of interest, which
presumably would be quite high in view of the high risk for which
compensation must be made, the creditor actually has suffered a
reduction in the present value of the debt, even though he will
eventually receive its full face amount. Unsecured creditors
have no similar protection and the amounts to be paid them may
be less than the face of amount of the debt. Secured creditors
may also be given priority.2°' The plan of extension may incor-
porate other specific guarantees by the debtor, including pro-
visions for payment by installments, 21 a highly desirable pro-
vision in cases where a mercantile stock in trade is being liqui-
dated. If the creditors so desire, the extension plan may give a
creditor's committee general supervision over the business of the
debtor.22 As a further safeguard the court may after confirma-
tion of the extension still retain jurisdiction over the case. 23 If
the court does so, it may adjudicate the debtor a bankrupt and
cause the estate to be liquidated according to the normal course of
bankruptcy proceedings if "without sufficient reason the debtor
defaults in any payment required to be made under the terms of
an extension proposal." 24  Thus, it would seem that the limita-
tions-of the extension plan are sufficiently flexible so as to allow
the preparation of an economically sound plan which will dojustice to all, while sufficient safeguards are provided so that a
dishonest debtor may not use such a plan as a means to obtain
further time in which to defraud his creditors.
There is, however, one limitation upon the extension plan which
may make it more difficult for the debtor to obtain the consent of
his creditors. The statute requires that the exemptions and al-
lowances of the debtor be set aside and the property so segregated
not subjected to the operation of the extension plan.25 Under
19 Sec. 74 (i); sec. 75 (k).
20 Sec. 74 (h); sec. 75 (j).
21 Sec. 74 (i); sec. 75 (j).
22 Sec. 74 (h). The section as to agricultural extensions allows the cred-
itors to hire the conciliation commissioner to perform such supervision.
Sec. 75 (b).
23 Sec. 74 (j) ; sec. 75 (1).
24 Sec. 74 (1). There is no provision for adjudication for any reason
under the section providing for agricultural extensions.
25 Sec. 74 (h) ; sec. 75 (j).
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the Act of 1898 this was true when the estate was liquidated in
bankruptcy, but was not true when compositions were arranged.20
The amount of these exemptions is regulated by the state
statutes,27 and may amount to a considerable sum. It would
seem unwise to deprive a debtor who desires to waive his exemp-
tions of the opportunity to do so as a bait to induce creditors to
consent to an extension proposal.
A revolutionary feature of the extension plan is the provision
that it shall extend the obligation of any person secondarily liable
for prompt payment of any debt extended by the plan.28 This is
not necessary to protect the petitioning debtor. It is essentially
a provision for the relief of indorsers. It would seem more in
accordance with justice to leave the rights of the creditors unim-
paired as against them, so that the creditor might force the in-
dorser to perform as he contracted. The indorser could then
prove his claim against the principal debtor, which claim would
then become subject to the terms of the extension proposal, fol-
lowing the system now prevailing in the ordinary bankruptcy
proceedings.29 It might perhaps be convenient to allow the
creditor if he wished to consent to the extension without this dis-
charging the persons secondarily liable from an obligation to pay
at the end of the extension period. It is to be regretted that the
statute does not clearly specify the rights of the indorser against
the principal debtor who fails to carry out the terms of the plan
of extension.
The amendment is poorly drafted in the parts which attempt
to describe the jurisdiction which the court acquires over the
property of the debtor. It contains a provision that the court in
which the petition is filed shall have exclusive jurisdiction over
the debtor and his property wherever it is located.30 This pro-
vision standing alone would seem clear, but the amendment ap-
parently recognizes that despite the filing of the petition other
courts may have jurisdiction to proceed with cases already before
them. Express power is given to the court to enjoin, in its dis-
cretion, proceedings in other courts by secured creditors whose
claims might be affected by the extension proposal, until the pro-
posal has been acted on. 31 The section dealing specifically with
farmers expressly forbids certain types of suits, 82 but says that
26Sees. 47 (a), 12.
27 See 6.
28 See 76.
29 See. 57 (i).
so Sec. 74 (m) ; sec. 75 (n).
U Sec. 74 (n). The section as to agricultural extensions contains no such
provision. Cf. see. 11 of the Act of 1898.
32 See. 75 (o).
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this shall not bar the continuance of suits to collect taxes on prop-
erty not used for farming or in the home, or on land not used as a
farm or homestead.33 If the court had exclusive jurisdiction,
such jurisdiction must oust the other courts of their jurisdiction
in the pending suits. It would seem that an amendment is neces-
sary to clarify this situation.
It is now necessary to examine briefly the procedural steps by
which a desired extension may be obtained. The debtor may file
voluntarily a petition asking for such an extension, or if an in-
voluntary petition has been filed against him, the debtor may file
a petition for such an extension within the time allowed for filing
an answer.3 4 It will be noted that this time is considerably more
limited than that allowed for the filing of applications for compo-
sition which may be proposed even after adjudication. 35 The
statute does not contain any provision with reference to the con-
tents of the petition other than that it must contain a statement
that the debtor is insolvent or unable to meet his debts as they ma-
ture and is desirous of effecting a composition or extension of
time in which to pay his debts.36 The court must at once pass on
the legal sufficiency of the petition or answer.3 7 If the answer in
an involuntary proceeding is legally sufficient, an order of adjudi-
cation cannot be entered, unless the debtor fails to comply with
the terms which the court may impose to protect the estate.38
Under the Act of 1898 the court had discretion whether or not to
stay adjudication ;39 now it must do so although it may impose
conditions. If the proceeding is a voluntary one, a creditor may
controvert the facts alleged at or before the first meeting of the
creditors.40 But where the extension proposal is interposed in
33 Sec. 75 (p). Cf. note (1932) 17 Minn. L. Rev. 47 for a discussion of
situation as to suits in other courts by secured creditors under the Act of
1898.
3, Sec. 74 (a); sec. 75 (c). The time for filing an answer is fixed by sec.
18 (b) to be within five days after the return day of the writ. This time
may be extended by the court. Sec. 74 (a).
35 Under sec. 12 the composition proposal may be fied at any time before
or after adjudication.
36 Sec. 74 (a) ; sec. 75 (c). It is provided that the petition and answer
must be accompanied by the schedules of the debtor. Sec. 74 (a) ; sec. 75 (c).
37 Sec. 74 (a). The court also must be satisfied that the proposal is filed in
good faith. The section as to agricultural extensions contains no such pro-
visions.
38 Sec. 74 (a). The section as to agricultural extensions makes the stay
absolute "except as provided hereafter in this section". Sec. 75 (c). There
are no further provisions in the section.
39 Sec. 12 (a).
40 Sec. 74 (c). The truth of the issues thus raised is to be determined by
the court. There is no such provision in the section as to agricultural exten-
sions.
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an involuntary case, it would seem that no one is allowed to con-
trovert the facts alleged. In either case the creditor cannot ap-
parently question the legal sufficiency of the petition or answer,
which has only been passed on by the court ex parte. This would
be serious except for the fact that the petition or answer is so
simple and need allege so few facts.
If the petition or answer is found legally sufficient, the court
may appoint a custodian or receiver to take charge of the prop-
erty.41 The amendment does not specify the conditions under
which this power can be exercised.42 This would seem to confer a
dangerous power upon the court, for the improvident appoint-
ment of such officials would greatly increase the expense of the
proceedings. The Act of 1898 limits the power of the court to
appoint receivers or marshalls to cases where "the court shall
find it absolutely necessary, for the preservation of the estates". 43
This section would seem still to apply to the appointment of re-
ceivers even under the new amendment, but unfortunately there is
no similar limitation on the power to appoint custodians, for these
officers did not exist under the older law.
The court shall promptly call the first meeting of creditors.44
This provision is far weaker than the old law which required the
court to cause the first meeting to be held within a specified short
period.45 Even more remarkable is the requirement that the
notice of the call shall contain a summary of the inventory, a
brief statement of the debtor's indebtedness as shown by the
schedules and a list of the names and addresses of the secured
creditors and the fifteen largest unsecured creditors. 4 Un-
less a receiver or custodian is appointed there is no pro-
vision for the taking of the inventory.47 The new Supreme
Court rules are silent upon this subject but the official
form contains statements that an inventory and schedule is at-
tached.48 This would seem necessary for practical administra-
41 Sec. 74 (c). The section as to agricultural extensions contains no such
provision.
42 The rules adopted by the Supreme Court merely copy this wording.
43 Sec. 2 (3).
44 Sec. 74 (c). If a custodian or receiver has been appointed, this officer
makes the call. The section as to agricultural extensions provides that the
call is to be made by the conciliation commissioner. Sec. 75 (e).
45 Sec. 55 (a).
46 Sec. 74 (c) ; sec. 75 (e). Under the latter section the names of all un-
secured creditors must be listed.
4 The section as to agricultural extensions requires the farmer to file an
inventory after he has filed his petition or answer. The rules provide that
this must be done in 10 days. Supreme Court General Order 60.
48 Official form 64.
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tion, although it complicates the preparation of the petition or
answer. The first meeting seems almost a needless formality.
It may examine the debtor and elect a trustee. The only essential
thing is that the court shall, after hearing the parties in interest,
fix a time within which the application for confirmation of the
extension must be filed. 49 The trustee chosen by the meeting only
takes control of the property of the bankrupt if an adjudication is
subsequently made.50 Even in such a case, it would seem that
the creditors may only recommend rather than bindingly ap-
point.5 1 It will be noted that the examination of the debtor is
optional while under the old composition procedure it was a neces-
sary prerequisite to the confirmation of a composition.5 2
The next step is for the debtor to obtain the written consent of
a majority in number and amount of the creditors whose debts
will be affected by the extension. In the case of unsecured cred-
itors their claims must have been allowed,53 but in the case of se-
cured creditors there seems to be no requirement that the claims
have even been proved, except that all creditors must show that
their claim is free from usury as defined by the laws of the state
where it was contracted.54 This provision makes an important
change, since usury which did not invalidate the claim, did not
bar its proof under the older law. Secured creditors are simply
counted with the rest of the creditors; they need not be counted
at all if their debts are not affected. 55 Thus, it is possible for the
unsecured creditors to force the adoption of a plan against which
every secured creditor protests. Furthermore, there is no re-
quirement that the creditors be not closely connected with the
debtor by ties of blood or business relations.5 6 This is very dan-
gerous as they may be governed by such rather than their inter-
ests as creditors and aid in imposing an unfair plan.
49 Sec. 74 (d). The section as to agricultural extensions contains no pro-
vision for the election of a trustee, but does allow the creditors to name a
committee to prepare a supplementary inventory. Sec. 75 (e). The com-
missioner is then to prepare a final inventory. Sec. 75 (f).
50 Sec. 74 (1).
1 Supreme Court General Order 13 dealing with the situation caused by
the similar wording of sec. 44 in so far as it conflicts with sec. 2 (17).
52 Sec. 12 (a).
5s Sec. 74 (e). The section as to agricultural extensions appears to re-
quire that the claims of both secured and unsecured creditors have been al-
lowed. See. 74 (g).
54 Sec. 74 (g); sec. 75 (i).
55 Sec. 74 (e); sec. 75 (g).
56 Cf. sec. 59 (e) which provides that such creditors shall not be counted
in determining the total number of creditors for the purpose of deciding how
many petitioning creditors there must be in an involuntary petition.
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After the application for confirmation is filed, the court must
set a time for a hearing on it. After this hearing the court shall
confirm the extension if satisfied (1) that it includes an equitable
and feasible plan for liquidation for the benefit of secured cred-
itors whose claims are affected; (2) it is for the best interests of
all the creditors; (3) the debtor would be entitled to a discharge
in bankruptcy; and (4) that the plan has been proposed and ac-
cepted in good faith, the acceptance not having been procured by
fraud or other improper means.05 Even after confirmation, the
court may retain jurisdiction to protect and preserve the estate
and enforce the terms of the extension proposal.59 There was no
similar provision under the older law. The confirmation may be
set aside within six months after confirmation if it is shown that
it was procured by fraud, and that the applicant did not know of
the fraud at the time of confirmationOO This provision is the
same as the older law.61
There are only six reasons why a debtor may be adjudged a
bankrupt if he asks for an extension by petition or answer. They
are: (1) that he has failed to comply with any of the terms re-
quired of him for the protection of the estate; (2) he has failed
to make the required deposit necessary before the consideration
of the application for confirmation; (3) his proposal has not been
accepted by the creditors; (4) confirmation has been denied; (5)
in cases where .the court has retained jurisdiction after con-
firmation, the debtor has defaulted without sufficient cause in any
payment under the extension plan; and (6) if the court is satis-
fied that he commenced or prolonged the proceedings for the pur-
pose of delaying creditors or avoiding an adjudication in bank-
ruptcy. 62 It would seem that this sixth ground must be narrowly
interpreted, for all proposals for extension involve delaying
creditors and every time the plan is proposed by answer in an
involuntary case, adjudication is delayed. Perhaps the difficulty
can be solved by limiting this ground to cases in which delay was
the sole purpose of the proposal, or in which there was some
fraudulent intent. A clarifying amendment is desirable. If the
debtor is a person against whom an involuntary petition could
57 Sec. 74 (f) ; sec. 75 (h) (action by conciliation commissioner).
58 Sec. 74 (g). The section as to agricultural extensions allows confirma-
tion even where the farmer has done or omitted acts which would bar his
discharge. Sec. 75 (i).
59 Note 23 above.
"OSec. 74 (k) ; sec. 75 (m).
61 Sec. 13.
62 Sec. 74 (1). There is no provision for adjudication under the section
as to agricultural extensions.
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not be filed, he cannot be adjudicated without his consent. After
adjudication, the normal course of bankruptcy administration is
followed. 68
It is finally necessary to consider the constitutionality of the
new statute. It is settled that the power of Congress over the
subject of bankruptcy is not limited to the classes which might
become bankrupt under the law as it stood at the time the Con-
stitution was framed. 64 A person may be allowed to file as a
voluntary bankrupt even though he is not insolvent as the term is
used in the Act of 1898.65 Indeed, the great popular clamor
against the Act of 1867 was that it allowed any person who could
not pay his debts in full as they matured to be forced into bank-
ruptcy. 8 The plan for extensions is closely analogous in basic
principle to the composition agreements sanctioned by the Act of
1898.67 It is true that secured debtors are now affected by the
extension but it would seem that if Congress can force a dissent-
ing minority of unsecured creditors to be bound by a composition
agreement that it has power to do the same as to secure creditors.
Under the Act of 1898 the liens of such secured creditors may be
set aside in many instances. 68
It would seem to present writer that the new amendment is
capable of providing considerable relief to the hard-pressed indi-
vidual debtor. Perhaps it is the confused drafting of the statute
which has prevented more frequent resort to its provisions. Cer-
tainly a series of clarifying amendments are desirable.
GEORGE W. SIMPKINS, '33.
LIMITATIONS AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE ATTRAC-
TIVE NUISANCE DOCTRINE
Even since 1841, when Lord Denham, Chief Justice of the
Queen's Bench, laid down the controlling principles of what subse-
quently has been known as the "attractive nuisance doctrine",
there have been divergent interpretations, limitations, and exten-
sions of this rule. Lynch v. Nurdin1 has itself been regarded by
some courts as overruled or, at least, seriously impaired by later
68 Sec. 74 (m).
64 Hanover Nat. Bank v. Moyses (1902) 186 U. S. 181.
65 Note 7 above.
66 Remington on Bankruptcy (2nd ed.) p. 14.
67 Matter of Reiman (D. C. S. D. N. Y. 1874) Fed. Cas. No. 11,673; In Re
Reiman (C. C. S. D. N. Y. 1875) Fed. Cas. No. 11,675.
68 Sec. 67.
1 (1841) 1 Q. B. 29, 113 Eng. Rep. 1041.
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